The Doubtful Profitability of Foggy Pricing by Miravete, Eugenio J. - University of Pennsylvania
 
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org 
 
 
 
Working Paper #04-07 
 
October 2004 
 
 
 
Eugenio J. Miravete 
 
The Doubtful Profitability of Foggy Pricing
 
University of Pennsylvania, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
The Doubtful Profitability of Foggy Pricing?
Eugenio J. Miravete†
September 30, 2004
Abstract
This paper studies whether competition may induce firms abandoning deceptive pricing strategies aimed
to profit from mistaken choices of consumers. The empirical analysis focuses on the pricing practices
of early U.S. cellular firms, both under monopoly and duopoly. Foggy tariff options are those that are
dominated by another option or a combination of other tariff options offered by the firm. I also define
a measure of fogginess of non-dominated tariffs based on the range of airtime usage for which they are
the least expensive option among those available. Results indicate that firms offer more dominated tariff
options in a competitive market than under monopoly. While markets are profitable, perhaps because
they grow or because firms collude, the use of foggy tactics is not frequent. However, if the market
is more mature, or if firms do not cooperate, thus reducing the return to their investment, then they
commonly turn to foggy pricing.
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1 Introduction
People commonly complain about having to make choices among several tariff options when they, for instance,
subscribe to a cellular telephone service. The importance of these deliberation costs has created some business
opportunities, and thus the large number of options in many service and public utility industries has turned
popular some web sites —such as lowermybills.com— where consumers can compare the monthly dollar cost
of the service that they intend to use if they subscribe to any of the companies that offer it in a particular
local market.
More tariff options open the possibility for firms to take advantage of any bounded rationality issue
that makes the comparison among options difficult for consumers. But having numerous tariff options to
choose from should not be questioned because in principle, consumers could potentially benefit from a wider
selection of subscription choices. However, it is a very generalized idea that firms use this multitude of
tariff options to benefits from consumers’ mistakes.1 This belief has recently led the UK Office of Fair
Trading to launch an investigation on the benefits of limiting the number of tariff options that firms may
offer to their customers. There is a similar undergoing investigation by the regulatory authorities of India
as well. Why should regulatory bodies aim to restrict the choices of consumers? Shouldn’t they be given
the chance to learn which companies take advantage of their mistakes in an unfair manner? Why will the
market not be able to self-correct the existing strategies of deception? Being these normative questions
quite important, they should be preceded by a more modest one: Do firms really benefit from offering tariffs
explicitly designed to induce mistaken choices among consumers? The goal of this paper is to provide with
some empirical evidence that help us figure out the answer to this question.
There is a growing behavioral literature claiming that consumers commonly make wrong choices
when they are given several alternatives to choose from. Wrong choices lead consumer to regret their
previous decisions when the cost of use of the good or service is not minimized under the chosen alternative.
For instance, using cross-section information, Della Vigna and Malmendier (2003) and (2004) conclude that
individuals tend to overestimate the number of future visits to the gym when signing up for membership
to a health club. These authors suggest a model of hyperbolic discounting to explain such mistakes. Other
plausible explanations may include bounded rationality or reputation in social networks.
These problems are very similar to those faced by customers in many telecommunications services.2
Users of these services are normally required to choose among a set of tariff options ahead of their consumption
decision . Their ex ante choice will be ex post correct or not depending on the intensity of the use of the
1 See for instance the Leader and Britain sections of The Economist, April 10th-16th, 2004.
2 Indeed, many of the empirical questions put forward by the bounded rationality literature was empirically addressed
in many Bell Labs working papers over twenty years ago.
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service. Miravete (2002) and Miravete and Palacios-Huerta (2004) make use of detailed individual data
regarding local telephone use and tariff choice to show that while consumers make mistakes (in a cross-section
of data), these mistakes are not systematic. Actually, the evidence reported in these papers indicate that
consumers actively engage in switching tariff options aiming to minimize the monthly bill of their local
telephone service, even though the potential gains from switching are quite limited.
If consumers make mistakes in choosing among optional tariffs, firms could, in principle, take
advantage of such behavior when designing these options. How? Firms may not provide a clear description
of the features of the options hoping for consumers to subscribe to a tariff different from the least expensive
one for the realized service usage. The ambiguity of the features of the tariff option that consumers face
(as the incompleteness of any contract) defines the fogginess of the strategy employed by firms. This is an
argument much popularized by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996, §7) and recently revisited by Liebman
and Zeckhauser (2004) in the context of tariff design. However, the hypotheses that firms offer “many” tariff
options in order to get consumers confused is based only on circumstantial evidence and, regardless of the
popularity of this opinion, it has never been empirically evaluated.
The goal of this paper is to provide with a first evaluation of whether firms appear to successfully
engage in foggy pricing strategies aimed at confusing consumers; document whether these strategies are more
likely to happen in monopolistic rather than in competitive markets; determine whether foggy strategies are
just the result of phasing out old tariff options offered previously to consumers; and last but not least,
establish whether firms engagement in foggy pricing could be explained by the low expected return of adding
another non-dominated pricing strategy instead. The analysis carried out in this paper is also complementary
of those mentioned above in the sense that while all those studies made use of individual consumer demand
data, the present work is based on tariff information identifying the pricing strategy of the agents on the
supply side of the market.
Little is known about how firms decide upon their pricing tactics. Recently, the work of Seim
and Viard (2004) has analyzed how entry of new firms affects the number of tariff options offered by
the incumbents. In this paper I, address the correlation among observable market characteristics and the
number of tariff options offered by cellular telephone companies as well, but in addition I also analyze the
characteristics of the tariff options offered regarding their fogginess.
The definition of foggy strategy is in itself quite ambiguous. In what matters most for this paper
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) claim that firms use foggy strategies for a variety of reasons aiming to
conform the perceptions of their customers, as well as competitors in order to hide information and profit
from it. These authors claim that firms hide information when, for instance, they introduce a new product
at a very low price to induce consumers switching standard or simply develop a taste for the product in
order to profit from later sales at higher prices. Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996, §7.3) explicitly mention
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the complexity of telephone tariffs as one of the examples where firms may use these tactics to profit from
consumers hoping that they do not choose the least expensive tariff option for their consumption. Complexity
is a defining feature of the fogginess of the pricing strategy because it makes more difficult for consumers to
compare the cost of the service across different providers. It also serves as a way to avoid fierce competition
as it is difficult for competitors to identify the profile of consumers that they should target with lower price
offers. Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) argue that this same complexity, by softening competition may
serve as a way to induce firms to cooperate while competing only superficially (co-opetition).
An obvious criticism to foggy tactics is that they may conform at best, a short run strategy.
Consumers will eventually learn how to minimize the expense necessary to enjoy the service according
to their preferences and competition may end up “lifting the fog” when other firms introduce attractive,
simple, and less expensive tariffs. This was the case of the failed “Value Pricing” initiative of American
Airlines or the successful “Ten Cents a Minute” campaign of Sprint, both conducted in the early 1990s.
Therefore, the question posed at the beginning of this section could be qualified as follows: Is foggy
pricing still a profitable strategy even in the short run? The answer will certainly be industry specific. It is
difficult to give a single answer that conforms appropriately the institutional features and business practices
of airlines, telephone, entertainment, and computer industry, just to mention a few that employ these tactics.
The contribution of this paper consists of addressing the issue of fogginess from an empirical perspective for
the first time, thus precisely stating what we should understand by foggy pricing strategy and suggesting
ways to measure it beyond the generic description of complexity in a manner that is useful for the empirical
analysis.
In order to carry out this task, I will study the pricing strategies of the early U.S. cellular telephone
industry. I use a rich data set comprising the tariff information of all cellular telephone companies present
in the early U.S, cellular market between 1984 and 1988. There are clear advantages of studying this case:
1. Complexity of telecommunications tariffs is related not only to the number of tariff options offered by
telephone carriers, but to the different dimensions of pricing considered such as peak, shoulder, off-peak,
distance, identity of the called party, network terminating the call (mobile-to-mobile vs. mobile-to-fixed
line), roaming charges, rollover minutes of unused allowance, et cetera. One obvious advantage of the
tariffs offered in the early U.S. cellular industry is that they only screen consumers with respect to
three dimensions: pricing of peak and off-peak airtime usage plus a monthly allowance of free minutes
associated to the payment of a monthly fixed fee. These relatively simple pricing schemes allows me
to define concise measures of what is a foggy tariff option, and to measure the degree of fogginess of a
tariff.
2. The available data do not contain a representative average price of consumption for every nonlinear
tariff offered, but rather the whole tariff information necessary to compute the monthly bill for any
– 3 –
profile of consumer. This information, together with a measure of market penetration, allows me to
evaluate the expected profits associated to price discrimination for each firm in the sample. I will make
use of this estimate to evaluate whether the use of foggy pricing is determined by the return to further
price discrimination offering non-foggy options.
3. Following the rules set up by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC ), two firms were allowed
to compete in the early U.S. cellular market in each of the 305 metropolitan areas (SMSA). However,
a miscalculation in the procedure to evaluate the awarding of the second nonwireline license led to a
temporary monopoly in many of the largest markets. This is a remarkable feature of this industry
because entry of the second cellular carrier is, contrary to Seim and Viard (2004), pretty much
exogenous, since it depends on a court decision rather than on pricing of the incumbent firm. The
existence of two differentiated market structures allows me to study the different pricing behavior
and the inclination of firms to use foggy strategies in monopolistic and duopolistic market structures,
respectively.
4. Data include a panel with many demand and cost indicators for each market and firms of this industry.
Cross-section variation allows me to identify the effect of market characteristics and firm identity in
the design of pricing strategies while the added time variation of the panel allows me to address issues
such as learning and most importantly to control for the phasing out of previous tariff options.
The first and most important task is to define what characterizes a tariff option as foggy. The
relative simplicity of the pricing strategies offered by the early cellular carriers turns the following practical
definition also into one that does not ignore any relevant feature of the tariffs: A foggy tariff option is
dominated by one or by a combination of the other tariff options offered by the firm. If consumers subscribe
to a foggy tariff option, they could always reduce their expenses by switching to a different tariff option. In
order to determine whether a tariff option is dominated or not, I evaluate the offered tariffs of each firm in
each market and time over all possible combinations of peak and off-peak consumption adding up to a total
of 1,000 minutes of airtime usage.3 Tariffs include a monthly fixed fee as well as an allowance of peak and
off-peak minutes plus a differentiated charge for peak and off-peak minutes. At this time, firms do not offer
any other type of volume discounts.
Table 1 shows some of the general features of the pricing in the early cellular market. First, firms
offered only few tariff options. Indeed, in monopolistic markets, almost half of the firms only offered a single
tariff option, quite differently from nowadays. The transition from monopoly to duopoly clearly increase
the alternatives for consumers to choose from. One third of the firms offered three options being two and
four alternatives almost as popular. The increase in options available to consumers could be interpreted
3 At this early market, airtime consumption exceeding 1,000 minutes was rare. Hausman (2002) reports that the
average cellular telephone airtime usage in the U.S. first reached 160 minutes per month in 1994.
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Table 1: Frequency Distributions of Number of Tariff Options
All Observations Monopoly Duopoly
No. Options Frequency Rel.Freq. Frequency Rel.Freq. Frequency Rel.Freq.
1 106 0.1941 43 0.4388 63 0.1406
2 121 0.2216 15 0.1531 106 0.2366
3 181 0.3315 29 0.2959 152 0.3393
4 98 0.1795 8 0.0816 90 0.2009
5 32 0.0586 3 0.0306 29 0.0647
6 8 0.0147 8 0.0179
Mean 2.7308 2.1122 2.8661
Variance 1.4742 1.3378 1.4048
Kendall’s τ -0.0461 (1.61) 0.1464 (2.14) -0.0822 (2.60)
Wireline -0.2733 (6.09)
Nonwireline 0.1011 (2.25)
Absolute and relative frequency distribution of the number of non-dominated tariff options offered by
each active firm. Kendall’s τ measures the correlation among the count numbers of effective and foggy
options offered by each firm. The corresponding absolute value t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
in different ways. Seim and Viard (2004) would conclude that competition leads to an increase of variety
for consumers. Alternatively, we could think that competition induces firms to be more sophisticated in
their attempt to extract informational rents to consumers, and thus, they increase their expected profits by
better screening among different consumer types. The foggy tactics explanation would conclude that this
increase in the number of options is an attempt to benefit from mistaken choices by consumers or to soften
competition. But, does the larger number of tariff options offered lead to more fogginess? The measure of
association between total and foggy tariff options at the bottom of Table 1 provides with a first piece of
evidence against the latest interpretation. Notice that a larger number of tariff options in monopoly goes
together with more foggy alternatives. The same is true for the entrant nonwireline carrier in the duopolistic
markets. However, the incumbent wireline carrier drastically redesign its pricing strategy after entry of the
competitor to offer less foggy options. The immediate conclusion is that competition appears to discipline
firms in limiting the use of deceptive strategies. But of course, this is at odds with the common belief, and
further and more detailed analysis is required.
The definition of foggy pricing given above identifies whether a tariff option is dominated or not.
Thus, in the empirical analysis of this paper, I do not only study whether firms offer a larger or smaller
number of tariff options (complexity) but also whether the offering of some of these options is aimed to induce
mistaken choices (deception). However, the analysis of the share of options offered that are dominated can
only provide with a partial answer to the question of fogginess. For instance, if one of the options offered by
the firms is not dominated only in a very small range of airtime usage, it is likely that it induces consumers
to pay higher monthly bills than under some other alternative tariff option. In this paper, I use an analog
of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI ) defined over the share of minutes for which each tariff option is
the least expensive one to account for the degree of fogginess among the non-dominated tariff options.
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Evidently, the potential fogginess of a pricing strategy may go beyond whether a particular tariff
option is dominated or not, or whether a non-dominated option is actually non-dominated only for a
consumption range of say, 153 to 157 peak minutes and 40 to 44 off-peak minutes of usage. For instance,
in an experience good markets, such as cellular service has turned out to be, an artificially low introductory
pricing to induce subscription may also be considered somewhat a foggy strategy because consumers are not
fully aware of the level of future expenses that the current subscription decision may lead to. However, and
contrary to the software industry, cellular service has become more and more affordable as its use generalized
and technology evolved, and this argument can easily be ignored.
An alternative to foggy pricing that could explain why dominated tariff options are offered to
consumers in a moment in time is that such options are currently being phase-out. Thus, consumers who
subscribed this option in the past are not automatically switched to one of the new options, but the firm
does not intend, neither expect, that new customers subscribe to such option any more. Fortunately the data
includes which tariffs were offered in the past, and thus, I can control whether dominated tariffs respond to
phasing out of previously offered options or not when conducting the empirical analysis.
Results indicate that firms offer more non-dominated tariff options in a competitive regime than
under monopoly, and that indeed, the incumbent wireline carrier offer substantially more options than the
entrant nonwireline operator. The number of tariff options increases with market coverage but decreases with
profitability although these effects are only present in the duopoly phase of the markets. Thus, as the market
matures, firms appear to offer more options in order to extract additional informational rents and compensate
their limited return. Expected profits only decrease marginally the fogginess of the non-dominated strategies
offered by monopolist. However, and perhaps this is the most important result of the paper, higher expected
profits reduce the share of foggy options offered by competing firms. Therefore, competition appears to
correct deceptive pricing strategies. Finally, incumbents do not appear to use neither the number of tariff
options offered or their fogginess as a strategy to sign up consumers immediately before the nonwireline
carrier enters the market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 discusses how three key
explanatory variables are constructed from the tariff information: the expected profits per active customer,
a measure of market penetration, and the indicator of phasing out of tariff options. As these features are
actually determined simultaneously with the design of the tariff, I need to instrument them using exogenous
cost and market indicators. Section 4 presents the results of a count data regression model where the
number of non-dominated tariff options offered by each firm in each market and time period is explained
by market characteristics, and the identity of the owner of the license, as well as the profitability, market
coverage, and phasing out indicators. Results are always presented for five alternative specifications of the
model distinguishing between monopoly and duopoly markets, and whether entry of the second operator
had already been authorized by courts or not to control for the possibility of dynamic pricing. Section
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5 estimates a fractional response model to study the determinants of the share of tariff options that are
dominated. Section 6 defines a measure of fogginess of the non-dominated options and conducts a similar
fractional analysis to explain this feature of the non-dominated tariff options using observable characteristics
of the market and the identity of firms plus the profitability, coverage, and phasing-out indicators of Section
3. Section 7 concludes.
2 Pricing in the Early U.S. Cellular Industry
By mid 1980s, the FCC granted permission to create 305 non–overlapping cellular markets around SMSAs.
Concerns about the viability of a fully competitive model led the FCC to authorize only two carriers in each
market. One of the two cellular licenses –the B block or wireline license– was awarded to a local wireline
carrier, i.e., a company with experience in fixed telephony, while the A block –the nonwireline license– was
initially awarded by comparative hearing to a carrier other than the local wireline incumbent.
Licenses were awarded in ten tiers, from more to less populated markets, beginning in 1984. In
general the wireline licensee offered the service first and enjoyed a temporary monopoly position until the
nonwireline carrier entered the market, normally within six months of being awarded the license as required
by the FCC. However, the administrative review process to award licenses among hundreds of contenders only
based on technical issues and investment commitments proved to be far more costly than initially expected.
After awarding the first 30 SMSA licenses by means of this expensive and time consuming beauty contest
—there were up to 579 contenders for a single license—, and while the application review of the second
tier of 30 markets was on its way, rules were adopted to award the remaining nonwireline licenses through
lotteries. Court appeals against the administrative award of the nonwireline licenses in the earlier tiers, and
legal, technical, or managerial difficulties to start operating the lottery-awarded licenses in subsequent tiers
led to a situation of temporary monopoly in many of the largest local cellular markets.
In this paper I construct a balanced panel with up to four observations per market, including the
tariffs offered to consumers by each firm in the earliest and latest quarter of the monopoly and duopoly
phases. Some firms start operating earlier than others, and thus, including more observations of those who
are present for a longer period could easily bias the results in favor of the observed behavior of the largest
markets where licenses were awarded earlier. Furthermore, tariffs do not change too frequently and these four
observations capture most of the pricing behavior of cellular carriers. Descriptive statistics of the variables
used in this study are presented in Table 2 distinguishing by market structure.
Tariff data are complemented with market specific demand and cost information as well as an
ownership indicator for each firm. The empirical analysis will relate pricing decisions to observable demand
characteristics that may condition the distribution of consumers’ unobserved heterogeneity that induces firms
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
All Observations Monopoly Duopoly
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
duopoly 0.8205 0.3841 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
wireline 0.5897 0.4923 1.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.5006
time 13.0641 4.7392 7.9898 4.9461 14.1741 3.8981
nearend 0.1227 0.3284 0.6837 0.4674 0.0000 0.0000
mkt-age 18.2582 16.7214 13.2143 13.5626 19.3616 17.1520
business 32.0924 52.7353 44.9618 67.6731 29.2772 48.5044
commuting 24.7027 3.0556 25.9908 2.8489 24.4210 3.0297
tcells 21.0842 22.6944 17.5102 18.0665 21.8661 23.5310
growth 1.1379 1.0350 1.2602 1.0658 1.1112 1.0275
income 26.1772 3.8048 27.9126 3.5988 25.7976 3.7464
education 12.5379 0.2534 12.5378 0.2468 12.5379 0.2551
pop-age 32.5516 2.9821 32.7449 2.7853 32.5094 3.0248
population 1.1999 1.5044 1.6217 1.8179 1.1077 1.4124
poverty 10.5963 2.8796 11.0020 2.9435 10.5076 2.8611
varpoverty -109.9628 69.6917 -118.6188 72.6203 -108.0693 68.9734
regulated 0.4615 0.4990 0.4490 0.4999 0.4643 0.4993
ameritech 0.0916 0.2887 0.1020 0.3043 0.0893 0.2855
bellatl 0.0623 0.2419 0.0612 0.2410 0.0625 0.2423
bellsth 0.1648 0.3714 0.1837 0.3892 0.1607 0.3677
centel 0.0989 0.2988 0.0204 0.1421 0.1161 0.3207
contel 0.1026 0.3037 0.0816 0.2752 0.1071 0.3096
gte 0.1282 0.3346 0.0612 0.2410 0.1429 0.3503
nynex 0.0769 0.2667 0.0612 0.2410 0.0804 0.2721
pactel 0.1172 0.3220 0.0816 0.2752 0.1250 0.3311
swbell 0.1136 0.3176 0.0612 0.2410 0.1250 0.3311
uswest 0.1026 0.3037 0.1224 0.3295 0.0982 0.2979
plans 3.2143 1.3933 2.6327 1.4530 3.3415 1.3484
effplans 2.7308 1.2142 2.1122 1.1566 2.8661 1.1853
share-foggy 0.1220 0.1834 0.1532 0.2077 0.1151 0.1771
fogginess 0.2878 0.2293 0.1714 0.2111 0.3133 0.2254
lead 11.1113 9.1202 10.6248 6.3028 11.2177 9.6297
wage 7.0424 1.7816 7.0892 1.5809 7.0321 1.8240
energy 1.6553 0.3479 1.7302 0.3707 1.6389 0.3409
operate 6.3149 1.6022 6.5499 1.5536 6.2635 1.6098
rent 16.3259 4.8042 16.3340 4.7611 16.3241 4.8189
prime 8.7891 1.0775 9.9751 1.1735 8.5297 0.8608
eng-costs 0.4879 0.5513 1.3138 0.4012 0.3073 0.3916
crime 65.0901 19.5310 67.0501 19.5573 64.6613 19.5208
svcrimes 0.1028 0.0319 0.1092 0.0327 0.1014 0.0315
density 14.3176 13.9338 15.0064 13.2810 14.1669 14.0824
temperature 66.3322 14.0953 55.9322 12.8809 68.6072 13.3165
rain 3.6858 1.8189 3.2323 1.9256 3.7850 1.7816
north 37.2120 5.0816 36.3747 5.0473 37.3951 5.0763
west -90.2946 15.5440 -91.4072 15.5796 -90.0513 15.5431
multimarket 3.5018 2.7496 3.6735 3.0487 3.4643 2.6820
bellbell 0.1026 0.3037 0.0000 0.0000 0.1250 0.3311
indbell 0.0586 0.2351 0.0000 0.0000 0.0714 0.2578
bellind 0.5824 0.4936 0.8367 0.3715 0.5268 0.4998
indind 0.2564 0.4371 0.1633 0.3715 0.2768 0.4479
profits 155.6150 41.0900 86.9119 14.3231 170.6438 27.4376
coverage 0.8029 0.2224 0.5556 0.2231 0.8570 0.1820
phs/pli 0.0305 0.1615 0.1667 0.3501 0.0007 0.0157
Observations 546.0000 0.0000 98.0000 0.0000 448.0000 0.0000
All variables defined in the text.
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to offer a different number of tariff options as screening device to increase profits by extracting consumers’
informational rents. Cost variables and other market specific information will be used to instrument for the
endogenous expected profits, coverage and phasing-out of tariff options. All money valued magnitudes are
expressed in dollars of July 1986. Data definitions and sources are the following:
• Tariff information is reported by Cellular Price and Marketing Letter, Information Enterprises, various
issues, 1984–1988.
• Socioeconomic and demographic data of each market comes from the 1989 Statistical Abstracts of the
United States; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, using the FCC Cellular Boundary
Notices, 1982–1987, available in The Cellular Market Data Book, EMCI, Inc. Variables include the
number of months since the market started operating, mkt-age; thousands of high potential business
establishments, business;4 the average commuting time in minutes, commuting; total population
of the SMSA in millions, population; average percent growth rate of population during the 1980s,
growth; median income in thousand of dollars, income; percentage of households with income below
the poverty level, poverty; median age of population, pop-age; and median number of years of
education, education. Since screening of consumers has also to do with the dispersion and not only
with the levels of these variables, I constructed varpoverty, an approximation to the variance of
poverty level assuming that the probability of finding an individual who belongs whose income level is
below the poverty line follows a Bernoulli distribution.
• Industry cost indicators for each market are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy; BOMA Experience Exchange Report: Income/Expense Analysis for Office Buildings,
various issues, 1985–1989; and Cellular Price and Marketing Letter, Information Enterprises, various
issues, 1984–1988; and 1990 U.S. Census. They include the population density of the market (im-
portant for the deployment of antennas), density; the state average electricity rates in dollars per
kilowatt/hour, energy; one-period lagged prime lending rate, prime; an index of operating expenses
per square foot of office space, operate;5 an index of average monthly rent per square foot of office
space in each market, rent; and an index of average annual wages per employee for the cellular
industry, wage. All these indicators are market specific. In order to identify demand effects properly
I also use the firm specific cost shifter eng-costs, consisting of an engineering estimate of the average
cost of production for each firm in the sample.6
4 business refers to what it was considered at that time as highly potential customers by cellular industry experts:
business service firms, health care, professional, and legal services, contract construction, transportation, finance, insurance,
and real state.
5 These expenses include cleaning, repair and maintenance, administrative costs, utilities, local taxes, security and
ground services, office payroll, as well as other leasing expenses associated with running an office.
6 This indicator was provided by an independent research firm to Economic and Management Consultants Interna-
tional, Inc., the firm who collected the tariff information used in this paper. See Parker (1990).
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• Weather and location data is available on the web at http://cdiac.esd.ornl.org, and includes average
temperature and precipitation for 1,221 stations in the contiguous continental states plus those of
Alaska.7 Data include the average quarterly temperature in Fahrenheit degrees recorded at the closest
station to each market, temperature; and the average quarterly precipitation in inches, rain.8
north and west indicate the longitude and latitude of the geographical center of each SMSA in
degrees.
• Crime information is obtained from the Uniform Crime Report, FBI, 1984–1988. We include the
number of offenses per 100,000 inhabitants, crime; number of violent offenses per 1,000 inhabitants
while the percent share of violent crimes in each market is denoted by, svcrimes.9
• Regulation was common in many markets as indicated by Shew (1994). The regulated dummy
indicates that firms are required to get approval to offer new tariffs. The regulation regime was
reported by the Cellular Telephone Industry Association in State of the Cellular Industry, 1992.
• Largest shareholder information is available from the FCC. We identify the largest carriers: ameritech:
Ameritech Mobile; bellatl: Bell Atlantic Mobile; bellsth: BellSouth Mobility; centel: Century
Cellular; contel: CONTEL Cellular; gte: GTE Mobilnet; nynex: Nynex Mobile; pactel: PacTel
Mobile Access; swbell: South West Bell; and uswest: US West Cellular.
• Market Players include an indicator of the particular combination firms operating in a particular market
as to whether they used to be part of the Bell System or alternative it is an independent firm. Thus
we have bellbell, bellind, indbell, and indind. In addition, multimarket indicates the number
of SMSA in which a particular firm is operating at a given time. In addition I include the nearend
indicator to identify whether the tariff offered in the last monopoly quarter in which the information
was reported falls within the last six months of actual monopoly phase.10 Both multimarket and
nearend are exogenous regressors because which market to enter and when is given by the FCC
decision or a later court ruling, instead of the will of cellular firms. Finally, duopoly identifies
the competition regime and wireline indicates whether a particular observation corresponds to the
wireline instead of the nonwireline carrier.
7 See Easterling, D.R., T.R. Karl, EH. Mason, P.Y. Hughes, D.P. Bowman and R.C. Daniels, United States Historical
Climatology Network (U.S. HCN) Monthly Temperature and Precipitation Data. ORNL/CDIAC-87, NDP-019/R3, 1996.
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
8 Climatology and location effects on the decision to subscribe to fixed local telephony has been documented by
Crandall and Waverman (2000) and Riordan (2002, §2).
9 There has been much speculation about the effect of crime as a driving force to subscription to cellular services.
Indeed, cellular carriers at this early stage of the industry actively played this marketing strategy. See Murray (2002, p.212-213).
Violent offenses include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property offenses
include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
10 The indicator can be computed because we always have information of the first tariff offered by the entrant who,
according to the terms of the license, should be operating within six months of being awarded such license.
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• Endogenous variables include the number of tariff plans, plans, how many of them are actually non-
dominated, effplans, the share of total tariffs offered that are indeed dominated, share-foggy, and
the degree of fogginess of the non-dominated options, fogginess, as constructed in Section 6. Other
endogenous variables are constructed, as described in the next section, to identify relevant information
upon which firms may condition their decision to offer more or less effective and/or dominated tariff
options. These variables are profits — measured in dollars per month per subscriber—, coverage,
and the percentage of foggy options that were offered in previous periods, phs/pli.
3 Accounting for Profitability, Coverage, and Phasing Out
When firms offer nonlinear tariffs, generally including quantity discounts, they are attempting to take
advantage of consumers heterogeneity of valuations to increase their profits. A nonlinear tariff serves as
a way to segment the market by giving consumer incentives to self-select into the tariff option of their liking,
the one that minimizes billing expenses for their ideal usage pattern. Characterizing the optimal tariff is
a complex but well studied problem —see for instance Maskin and Riley (1984) and Wilson (1993)—, and
it involves not only determining what is the optimal markup for each possible consumption level but also
deciding whether to exclude some consumers (because it is more profitable to serve only to a subset of them),
and in practice, how many and which limited number of tariff options will be offered to approximate the
ideal fully nonlinear tariff.
All these decisions determine the expected profits of the tariffs offered, as well as the market coverage.
These are interesting variables that condition the number and characteristics of the tariff options offered,
including their fogginess. In this section I will describe how this information can be recovered from the
data. In addition, as both profitability and coverage are endogenous variables, I will instrument them
with exogenous market and firm indicators in order to avoid endogeneity bias later when explaining the
determinants of the number of options offered and their fogginess as a function of coverage and, most
importantly for the goal of this paper, as a function of the expected profits of firms.
3.1 Expected Profits
Expected profits are a non-observable magnitude that drives pricing and investment decisions of firms. This
is also the case for monopolists that offer different tariff options to screen among heterogeneous consumers.
However, it is possible to obtain an estimate of each monopolist’s expectation if we adopt an equilibrium
approach, i.e., if we assume that a monopolist is actually maximizing expected profits when he offers a
particular nonlinear tariff. If this is the case, the shape of the tariff conveys very valuable information about
the monopolist’s perceived distribution of the heterogeneity of his consumers.
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The fact that the shape and position of a nonlinear tariff carries information that makes possible to
recover the distribution of consumer types was first pointed out by Miravete and Ro¨ller (2004) in a framework
of nonlinear pricing competition in a common agency environment.11 The idea is quite simple. There are two
elements that define any standard problem of nonlinear pricing: the specification of the consumer demand
and the distribution of consumer types. In general, a firm with market power solves the following problem:
max
q(θ),u(θ)
∫ θ
θ◦
{T [q(θ)]−K − c · q(θ)} dF (θ), (1a)
u˙(θ) = q(θ) ≥ 0, (1b)
q˙(θ) ≥ 0, (1c)
u(θ) = U [q(θ), θ]− T [q(θ)] ≥ 0, (1d)
where U [q, θ] represents the preferences for consumption of an individual of type θ; u(θ) is the rent of
consumer θ; T [q] is the tariff function; K is any fixed cost of production; c is an assumed constant marginal
cost of production; and F (θ) is a well-behaved, twice, continuously differentiable distribution of type θ
defined on a compact support [θ, θ]. The cutoff type θ◦ ∈ [θ, θ] identifies the consumer that is indifferent
between participating in the market or not, and for which the individual rationality constraint (1d) is exactly
equal to zero. The other two constraints of the problem, i.e., the incentive compatibility constraint (1b)
and the monotonicity of the control function (1c) ensure that the solution of this mechanism design problem
exists, and that it is implementable by a well behaved tariff function.
Economic theory has set the conditions leading to well-behaved separating equilibrium of this game,
namely the ranking of individual demands of consumers with different types should be independent of the
marginal tariff charged —the well-known single-crossing property—, and the distribution of types should be
smooth and exclude mass of probability concentrated around specific values of types, i.e., type distributions
should be increasing hazard rate.12 If these two assumptions hold, there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the distribution of consumer types and the optimal nonlinear tariff function for any given specification
of demand.
Therefore, in principle, I could estimate the parameters that index the distribution of consumer
types among a family of distribution provided some specification of demand. With all these elements at
hand, it will be possible to obtain the average expected profits of the monopolist using the same distribution
that he implicitly assumes when he offers the particular set of tariff options that he is actually offering in
11 See Miravete and Ro¨ller (2004, §3.4) and Appendix 2 for treatment of the monopoly case that better corresponds to
the present paper.
12On these matters, see for instance Maskin and Riley (1984), Tirole (1989, §3.5), or Wilson (1993, §6).
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the market. The evaluation of the expected profit for each firm is obtained through repeated random draws
from the estimated distribution of consumer types.
Provided that the single-crossing property of demand and the increasing hazard rate of the distri-
bution holds, Maskin and Riley (1984, §4) show that the optimal equilibrium tariff is a concave function of
q, airtime usage in our case, and therefore it can be implemented as the lower envelope of a continuum of
self-selecting two-part tariffs. However, firms rarely offer a fully nonlinear tariff option, but rather a menu
with few options as Table 1 documents for the early cellular industry.
Firms may have many reasons to offer only a few tariff options. One argument might be the training
of sales personnel to make them aware of the many tariffs offered. Another reason might be the substantial
marketing research resources needed to optimally design a large number of tariff options that effectively
screen consumers. On additional consideration could be the potential negative perception by consumers
when facing a large number of options to choose from and that might trigger that they consider simpler
options offered by the competitor. But the most important reason is that the foregone profits of offering an
additional tariff decreases rapidly with the number of tariff options as shown in full generality by Wilson
(1993, §8.3). Thus, recovering the structural parameters characterizing the demand, marginal cost, and the
distribution of consumer types needs to be adapted for the case when firms offer only a finite number of tariff
options because in such a case, the lower envelope of the offered tariff does not coincide with the general
fully nonlinear tariff solution of problem (1a)-(1d).
I assume that firms offer an (N + 1)-part tariff. Thus, if firms offer a single tariff option, N = 1,
this is two-part tariff consisting of a fixed monthly fee A1 and a single rate per minute p1. If a firm offers
two options, this leads to a three-part tariff defined by the lower envelope of two two-part tariffs given by
(A1, p1) and (A2, p2) so that A1 < A2 and p1 > p2.13 The solution of this problem will divide the support of
consumer types into contiguous compact regions defined by θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θN that identify those consumers
that would optimally choose each tariff option. More concisely, the objective function (1a) should be written
as:
N∑
j=1
{
Aj [F (θj)− F (θj−1)] + (pj − c)
∫ θj
θj−1
q (pj , θ) dF (θ)
}
. (2)
Maximization with respect to {pj , θj} subject to the constrains: θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θN and p1 > p2 >
. . . < pN leads to a set of first order conditions that have to be fulfilled by a firm offering an (N + 1)-part
tariff and that will identify the structural parameters of a parametric model of nonlinear pricing using only
13 Notice that I am ignoring the allowance of free minutes. There are two reasons for proceeding in this manner. First,
single dimensional screening models cannot handle allowances and rather they have to be imposed exogenously as a restriction
in the tariff problem. Second, in the present data, the allowance of the tariffs offered by firms rarely belongs to the lower
envelope of the menu of tariff options.
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the known features of the optional tariffs offered by the firms, i.e., the monthly fixed fee, the rate per minute,
and the market coverage. Notice that the market coverage identifies the cutoff type as:
coveragei = 1− Fi (θ◦) , (3)
where i identifies markets, while the fixed monthly fees enter the problem through the incentive compatibility
constrains so that:
Aj −Aj−1 =
∫ pj−1
pj
q (p, θj) dp. (4)
To solve this nonlinear problem I have to specify both the demand function and a parametric
distribution of types. As in Miravete (2004), I assume that individual demands are linear (quadratic utility
function):
q(p, θ) =
θ − p
γ
, (5)
while the distribution of θ is assumed to be a Burr type XII with parameter λ:
F (θ) = 1−
[
1− θ − θ
θ − θ
] 1
λ
; λ ≥ 0, θ ∈ [θ, θ]. (6)
I distinguish and treat separately the peak and off-peak dimension of each tariff. Thus, I use the
algorithm described in Miravete (2004) to recover the boundary types θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θN ; the cutoff type
θ◦; the marginal cost c; the slope of demand γ; and the indexing parameter of the distribution of consumer
types λ. This problem is exactly identified if firms offer just a single two-part tariff, and overidentified if
they offer two or more options. The procedure to obtain a firm specific estimate of the expected profits is the
following. I repeatedly solve this nonlinear problem for every firm-market-time tuple, both for the peak and
off-peak tariff over the consumption range 0-1,000 minutes. Once each solution as been found, I simulate the
distribution of consumer types according to the estimated firm-market-time specific distribution of types.
Then, for each tuple a single expected profit estimate is obtained assuming —as in Hausman (2002)— that
peak consumption represents 80% and off-peak 20% of the total airtime usage, respectively. This is the
endogenous variable profits that is instrumented in Section 3.4.
3.2 Coverage
The data does not include individual consumption, neither it does include the number of subscribers of each
firm. I only know the number of antenna sites used jointly by both operators at each time and across markets.
Each cell site accounts for 1,100 to 1,300 subscribers each, depending on the engineering configuration of the
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local network and the airtime usage pattern common at that time. This provides with an approximation to
the total number of subscribers in each market.14 , 15
Once the number of subscribers is approximated I need to determine the size of the potential market.
This is problematic, as its magnitude depends on decisions of an unknown number of consumers. Determining
the right size of the market share of the outside option is very much present in the recent literature on discrete
choice models of demand. Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) indicate that establishing
the right size of non-participating consumers should be decided on an industry by industry basis, accounting
for its basic institutional features.
In the case of the early cellular industry, this was a service clearly targeted to business and high
income individuals. Cellular telephones were far from popular as they are today. By the end of our
sample, there were only 1.6 million subscribers (as compared to the current 140 million according to the
CTIA’s November 2003 Semi-Anual Data Survey), and telephone sets were still priced over $2,500 (1986
dollars). Thus, I only consider the number of business in an area as potential cellular users and define
market penetration as coverage=1,300×tcells/business. Besides being more realistic, considering the
number of businesses in each SMSA produces non-negligible ratios, while if I considered the population of
the SMSAs instead, most of the pricing decisions of firms would consist on excluding the vast majority of
potential customers.
3.3 Phasing Out
In addition to profitability and coverage, I need to account for the possibility that current foggy options
are the result of previously offered alternatives that are being phased out. Tariff information was recorded
every time that a firm offered a differen set of options. Thus, it is possible to account whether a particular
dominated tariff option was previously offered as part of the menu of alternatives of each firm in the immediate
past. Variable phs/pli computes the ratio of current foggy options that were offered immediately before
relative to the total number of options of the current tariff.
3.4 Instrumental Regression
Expected profits, market coverage, and the phasing out indicator phs/pli are all simultaneously chosen
with the menu of tariffs offered to consumers. As they will serve as regressors in our econometric analysis,
14 The total number of antenna sites in each market is the right measure of capacity because the FCC required the
wireline company to resale access to its competitor without restrictions until the nonwireline company was fully operational in
order to foster competition and usage of the cellular service. See Vogelsang and Mitchell (1997, p. 207).
15 Furthermore, Parker and Ro¨ller (1997) made use of a small sample where both the antenna and subscription
information were available to show that the correlation between these two variables exceeded 90%.
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Table 3: Instrumental Regressions
profits coverage phs/pli
constant −65.5210 (2.03) 7.2168 (4.00) 4.2906 (3.22)
lead 0.3780 (3.21) 0.0160 (2.39) −0.0054 (0.93)
wage −0.0595 (0.06) 0.1611 (4.74) −0.0072 (0.25)
energy −5.7335 (1.51) −0.2248 (1.44) −0.0219 (0.14)
operate 1.0408 (0.81) −0.0712 (1.09) −0.0220 (0.43)
rent 1.1386 (3.72) −0.0504 (2.74) 0.0142 (0.94)
prime 4.6495 (2.64) 0.1245 (1.32) −0.1346 (1.76)
eng-costs 9.8756 (2.29) −0.1365 (0.72) 0.0046 (0.03)
crime −0.1319 (2.28) −0.0071 (2.01) 0.0024 (0.74)
svcrimes 80.6708 (1.81) −0.6608 (0.33) 1.4294 (0.94)
density 0.2178 (2.16) −0.0047 (1.19) 0.0028 (0.79)
temperature 0.2934 (2.06) 0.0053 (0.76) −0.0045 (0.83)
rain 0.1678 (0.15) −0.0926 (2.08) −0.0379 (1.15)
north 0.3055 (1.02) −0.0796 (4.78) −0.0003 (0.02)
west −0.4196 (3.58) 0.0136 (2.00) 0.0092 (1.94)
regulated 0.0029 (0.00) −0.1050 (0.81) 0.3352 (3.01)
multimarket −2.1120 (4.64) 0.1103 (3.65) 0.0854 (2.82)
indbell 27.7820 (2.62) −2.1862 (3.43) 1.7666 (3.12)
bellind 7.8229 (1.39) −2.2840 (6.92) −0.6283 (2.50)
indind 25.0792 (3.12) −4.5985 (7.64) 1.2037 (2.03)
ameritech −16.6657 (5.02) −0.0346 (0.13) 0.2038 (1.09)
bellatl −7.3201 (1.54) −0.0998 (0.44) 0.1145 (0.42)
bellsth 19.6436 (3.97) −1.6019 (5.28) −0.5418 (2.40)
centel 0.0565 (0.01) 2.2744 (7.09) −1.9829 (4.14)
contel −17.4414 (3.71) 1.8069 (5.34) −1.9836 (4.45)
gte −12.4823 (1.91) 0.7570 (1.74) −2.3457 (4.71)
nynex 10.9996 (1.94) −1.0683 (4.51) 0.0547 (0.22)
pactel −15.9193 (3.76) −1.8094 (6.32) −0.1459 (0.51)
swbell 4.4923 (1.14) −1.6064 (6.28) −0.3905 (1.72)
uswest 20.4119 (3.69) −1.8539 (7.71) 0.1319 (0.52)
wireline 0.0348 (0.02) −0.0006 (0.01) −0.0810 (0.87)
duopoly 96.4559 (21.55) 1.6359 (8.83) −2.6373 (19.07)
sumjshfj 0.1256 (0.80)
sumjhhfj −0.0013 (0.05)
lnL −2399.4096 −352.8408 −480.0861
The profits equation is estimated by OLS, while the coverage and the phs/pli equations are
estimated by a Bernoulli Quasi-Maximum Likelihood. Absolute, heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics
are presented in parentheses.
they need to be instrumented to avoid any endogeneity bias. The optimal nonlinear tariff responds to
both demand an cost variables. The usual “demand shifters” include here anything that may affect the
distribution of unobservable consumers’ valuations as in a nonlinear pricing problem we are concerned about
pricing optimally at different consumption levels. Thus, in order to identify these demand shifters that in the
end, and through complicated nonlinear relations will determine expected profits, coverage and the phasing
out of old tariff options, we need instruments that shift costs but that are uncorrelated with demand shocks.
Since in addition the data includes competing firms, it necessary to account for firm specific cost shifters.16
16 Observe that contrary to Bresnahan (1981) and (1987) or Berry et al. (1995), I cannot use the characteristics of the
tariff of the competitor in other markets as valid instruments, as the tariff characteristics are indeed endogenous to the analysis.
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Table 3 regress profits, coverage, and phs/pli on a set of market specific cost variables such as
the wage index of employees of the cellular industry, the prime lending rate in each market, the population
density of a market (affecting the deployment of antennas), and some other common costs of running a
business in each SMSA. While all these regressors capture common cost shifters, I also include variables that
may better capture firm specific effects such as the identity of the owner of the license; the possibility of
differentiated levels of efficiency due to accumulated experience captured by lead, the number of months
separating the entry of the wireline and nonwireline operators; and a firm specific engineering estimate of
the average operating unit costs as appraised by an independent research company, eng-costs.
In addition to these variables, instruments also include market specific variables that might affect
subscription decisions, such as geographical location, weather, or crime, as well as to the competition regime
that might have arisen among firms who used to belong to the Bell System or that on the contrary were
independent, recently created firms.
Two more instruments are included. multimarket intends to capture the effect on profitability
and coverage that the presence in several markets may have. While I am treating each market independently
from each other, firms operating in several markets may enjoy some important cost savings as they could
perhaps consolidate some activities across markets or establish a softer competition regime with other firms
also present in several markets. Finally, regulated attempts to capture whether firms that operated in
regulated markets behaved significantly different in their pricing behavior. The positive and significant effect
on the phs/pli regression is in accordance with Shew (1994), who argue that regulated firms initially filed
as many tariff options as possible in order to avoid future regulatory review, thus leading to important
phasing out of these obsolete tariffs as time passed and as regulation was never really enforced seriously in
this duopolistic industry.
The phasing out of certain tariff options are necessarily conditioned by previous choices of how many
options to offer and their design. Contrary to current features of the tariffs, such as their degree of fogginess
or the number of tariff options, the share of current options that were already offered in the past is, up
to certain extent, predetermined by previous pricing decisions. If demand shocks are market specific, as
opposed to nationally driven, the characteristics of the tariffs of the competitors in other markets during
past periods can also be used as valid instruments according to Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) and
Hausman (1996). Thus, the phs/pli equation includes the sum of the phasing out and fogginess ratio of
competing firms in all other markets where the firm operated in previous periods, sumjshfj and sumjhhfj,
respectively.
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4 The Number of Effective Tariff Options Offered
I begin the empirical analysis of the tariff data by studying the determinants of the total number of non-
dominated strategies. In Table 4 I present the results of estimating a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood
(PMLE) count data model that relate the observed market/firm indicators plus the instruments of Section
3 to the number of tariff options offered by each firm according to the following exponential mean function:17
E [effplansi |xi] = exp (x′iβ) . (7)
The variance of a Poisson distribution is identical to the mean. Thus, inference can be seriously
compromised when the expected distribution of effplans conditional on x is not equidispersed. The PMLE
estimation method obtain consistent estimates of β based on the Poisson likelihood function, but employs
a robust covariance matrix that allows for overdispersion as well as for the less common underdispersion,
which happens to be what characterizes the empirical distribution of effective number of plans in the present
sample.18
If consumer types are distributed on a compact support, the optimal solution to problem (1a)-(1d)
is a concave fully nonlinear tariff implementable by a continuum of self-selecting two-part tariff options.
However, either because of commercialization costs, or because of negative induced goodwill effects on the
customer base, firms only offer a few tariff options. As incremental profits of offering additional tariff
options decrease with the number of options offered, we should expect that firms offer more options when
total expected profits are higher. This will occur when the proportion of high valuation consumers is large,
which in turn translates into more concave optimal nonlinear tariffs to ensure that the large proportion of
high valuation customers do not have incentive to deviate and behave as low valuation customers. Results
reported in Table 4 are however inconclusive regarding the effect that expected profits have on the number
of non-dominated tariff options offered by firms.
17Actually, Table 4 reports the response for an hypothetical market with average characteristics. The same procedure
is adopted when presenting results in later sections of this paper. In this case, the marginal effects can be written as:
∂E [effplans |x]
∂xj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ x = βj exp
(
x′β
)
.
18Compare the mean and variance of the number of non-dominated tariff options in Table 1. For completeness I also
estimated a Gamma-count maximum likelihood model to confirm that data were indeed underdispersed. I do not report these
estimates —which produce very similar marginal effects— because the inference is more robust using the PMLE approach. If
the data generating process is not given by a gamma distribution, the estimates of the gamma-count model are not consistent.
PMLE will, on the contrary, produce consistent and asymptotically normal estimates regardless of the data generating process
as long as the conditional mean function (7) is correctly specified. On the gamma-count model see Cameron and Trivedi (1998,
§4.3.4) and Winkelmann (1995). As for the advantages of the robust PMLE estimation and the computation of the robust
covariance matrix see Cameron and Trivedi (1998, §3.2.3), Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984), and Wooldridge (2002,
19.2.2).
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Table 4: Number of Non-Dominated Tariff Options
I II III IV V
constant 8.7656 (1.33) 8.5860 (1.33) 6.9982 (1.82) 5.3428 (1.55) 5.7627 (1.70)
time 0.0357 (1.07) 0.0298 (0.85) 0.0345 (1.88) 0.0428 (2.79) 0.0214 (1.37)
mkt-age −0.0088 (0.56) −0.0100 (0.66) −0.0090 (2.02) −0.0077 (1.93) −0.0079 (2.04)
commuting 0.0279 (0.38) 0.0254 (0.34) −0.0331 (1.04) −0.0564 (2.14) −0.0315 (1.14)
coverage −0.0995 (0.17) −0.0404 (0.07) 0.4110 (1.79) 0.5581 (2.97) 0.3719 (1.96)
population 0.1554 (2.28) 0.1476 (2.22) 0.1360 (1.57) 0.1336 (2.06) 0.1653 (2.45)
pop-age 0.0679 (2.07) 0.0695 (2.13) 0.0276 (1.57) 0.0199 (1.34) 0.0247 (1.67)
education −0.4593 (1.02) −0.4772 (1.05) −0.2365 (0.80) −0.2429 (0.91) −0.2402 (0.92)
business −0.0030 (1.81) −0.0030 (1.80) −0.0000 (0.00) −0.0001 (0.07) −0.0007 (0.42)
growth 0.2498 (2.60) 0.2322 (2.26) 0.0370 (0.50) 0.0391 (0.61) 0.0385 (0.61)
income −0.0176 (0.41) −0.0106 (0.24) 0.0038 (0.15) −0.0045 (0.22) −0.0050 (0.24)
poverty −0.7091 (3.53) −0.6778 (3.47) −0.1290 (1.13) −0.1131 (1.10) −0.1660 (1.60)
varpoverty −0.0273 (3.62) −0.0263 (3.57) −0.0052 (1.21) −0.0043 (1.09) −0.0063 (1.60)
regulated 0.1481 (0.91) 0.1747 (1.14) 0.2407 (2.08) 0.2887 (2.87) 0.2357 (2.36)
profits −0.0107 (1.32) −0.0109 (1.35) −0.0117 (2.37) 0.0015 (0.88) −0.0131 (2.94)
ameritech 1.6438 (6.24) 1.5555 (5.08) 0.6847 (3.05) 1.0902 (6.10) 0.7459 (3.76)
bellatl 1.3131 (4.31) 1.2978 (4.15) 0.7480 (3.31) 0.9048 (4.66) 0.8270 (4.24)
bellsth 0.0714 (0.31) 0.0835 (0.38) 0.7709 (3.96) 0.4907 (3.07) 0.6585 (3.79)
centel 1.3475 (2.14) 1.3545 (2.19) 0.6894 (3.23) 0.5077 (2.79) 0.7479 (3.94)
contel −0.1070 (0.44) −0.1194 (0.47) −0.2254 (0.99) −0.1722 (0.84) −0.1488 (0.73)
gte 0.1746 (0.44) 0.2275 (0.60) −0.0308 (0.16) 0.0635 (0.37) 0.0651 (0.38)
nynex 2.6802 (9.09) 2.6462 (8.29) 1.2996 (4.79) 1.3325 (5.64) 1.5350 (6.51)
pactel 0.0011 (0.00) 0.0854 (0.18) −0.1647 (0.87) −0.0452 (0.26) −0.1801 (1.04)
swbell 0.3182 (0.97) 0.3205 (0.98) 0.5563 (3.06) 0.5064 (3.22) 0.4484 (2.83)
uswest 1.7348 (4.60) 1.7748 (4.86) 1.4990 (5.35) 1.3384 (6.19) 1.6114 (7.16)
nearend −0.1238 (0.64) 0.3728 (1.41)
wireline 0.1814 (1.95)
duopoly 1.9408 (4.07)
lnL −132.0972 −132.1245 −732.5380 −875.9198 −872.8985
Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of regressors of Poisson PMLE. Absolute value, robust, Eicker-Huber-White
t-statistics for unspecified variance matrix are reported between parentheses. Monopoly sample is used to obtain estimates of
model I and II; Duopoly for III; and all observations for IV and V.
I consider five different models. Model I and II correspond to the monopoly phase. The only
difference between these tow models is that the former includes nearend, the indicator that the observation
corresponds to the last six months of monopoly phase in a given market either because the nonwireline license
has been already awarded through lottery, or because courts have ruled in favor of one of the contenders for
such license. Model III only uses the data of duopolistic markets. Models IV and V pool the monopoly and
duopoly phases although the latter allows for incumbent and competition specific effects.
Table 4 shows that there is a substantial difference between the pricing practices under monopoly
and duopoly. Overall, more tariff options are offered in duopoly than in monopoly. There is an additional
incumbent effect, thus indicating that this firm reacts to the entry of the competitor by trying to better
screen his heterogeneous customer base.
Table 4 also documents other interesting facts. For instance, there are very important firm specific
effects, which may indicate that cellular companies, regardless of the characteristics of the markets have a
definite corporate strategy that is applied across different geographical areas. Thus, for instance, nynex
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and uswest offer around 1.5 more tariff options than the average firm. Firms competing in markets with
large cellular penetration offer more non-dominated options perhaps attempting to capture informational
rents as a way to increase their return in an environment where most valuable customers are already signed
in. Other results indicate that, although slowly, as competitive markets mature the number of tariff options
gets reduced.
Two more results are worth being pointed out. First regulated firms always offer a larger variety
of tariff options. This is consistent with the argument given by Shew (1994) —and mentioned above— that
these firms attempted to circumvent the effects of future regulatory restrictions by having as many tariff
options approved as possible. It turned out that these more numerous tariff options were non-dominated,
as foggy pricing strategies would probably be rejected by the regulator. Finally, it is remarkable that
demographics are not significant at all in the regressions using data from the duopoly phase, while few of
them are significant in models I and II. This may indicate that the observed average market characteristics
have little to do with the distribution of unobservable individual characteristics driving consumption, and
ultimately the design of nonlinear tariffs and the number of tariff options that implements it in practice.
5 Proportion of Foggy Tariff Options
The previous section only looked at effective screening, i.e., the number of tariffs that firms offered aiming to
distinguish among consumers with different valuations. These options intend to extract as much consumer
surplus as possible (informational rents) but do not generate profits out of deception; or at least not
completely.
I now consider all tariff options offered by firms, and not only the non-dominated. In this section
I attempt to identify the determinants of the share of tariff options that are dominated, i.e., a measure
characterizing the intensity in which a firm intends to profit from inducing mistaken choices among his
customers. In order to control for the possibility that those dominated options were not exclusively intended
to profit from deception, Tables 5 and 6 estimate two specifications of models I-V, including the later the
phasing out indicator phs/pli.
The estimation of these models has to account for the fact that the endogenous variable is a fraction,
i.e., 0 ≤ share-foggy ≤ 0. Since, the endogenous variable can actually take value 0 with positive
probability, applying the log-odds ratio is not appropriate. I thus compute the Bernoulli pseudo maximum
likelihood estimator of Papke and Wooldridge (1996), which as in the case of the PMLE of Section 4 leads
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Table 5: Share of Foggy Options
I II III IV V
constant −0.1109 (0.72) −0.1361 (0.76) −0.7072 (1.14) −1.1097 (2.00) −0.8536 (1.54)
time −0.0024 (2.01) −0.0023 (1.79) −0.0022 (0.74) 0.0006 (0.25) −0.0030 (1.06)
mkt-age 0.0006 (1.16) 0.0007 (1.47) 0.0003 (0.38) −0.0000 (0.05) −0.0001 (0.18)
commuting −0.0021 (0.79) −0.0018 (0.68) 0.0088 (1.65) 0.0061 (1.22) 0.0114 (2.36)
coverage 0.0037 (0.37) 0.0010 (0.09) 0.0041 (0.12) 0.0011 (0.03) −0.0330 (1.15)
population −0.0026 (0.85) −0.0024 (0.80) −0.0093 (0.60) −0.0144 (1.16) −0.0094 (0.69)
pop-age −0.0027 (3.30) −0.0028 (3.22) 0.0116 (4.47) 0.0075 (2.84) 0.0081 (3.36)
education 0.0112 (0.90) 0.0146 (0.97) 0.0027 (0.06) 0.0166 (0.38) 0.0081 (0.19)
business 0.0001 (2.07) 0.0001 (1.90) −0.0001 (0.27) −0.0000 (0.02) −0.0001 (0.19)
growth −0.0054 (1.71) −0.0041 (1.18) −0.0058 (0.56) −0.0023 (0.24) −0.0021 (0.22)
income 0.0008 (0.64) 0.0004 (0.26) 0.0055 (1.25) 0.0025 (0.53) 0.0029 (0.65)
poverty 0.0135 (2.38) 0.0116 (2.02) 0.0459 (2.05) 0.0429 (2.14) 0.0291 (1.57)
varpoverty 0.0005 (2.22) 0.0004 (1.90) 0.0019 (1.98) 0.0016 (1.96) 0.0010 (1.43)
regulated −0.0031 (0.69) −0.0048 (1.06) 0.0088 (0.52) 0.0128 (0.78) 0.0072 (0.45)
profits −0.0002 (0.95) −0.0002 (0.79) −0.0031 (4.05) −0.0005 (1.98) −0.0036 (5.11)
ameritech −0.0103 (0.99) −0.0053 (0.54) −0.0596 (1.55) 0.0028 (0.08) −0.0582 (1.51)
bellatl 0.0325 (4.25) 0.0334 (4.38) −0.0146 (0.36) 0.0632 (1.70) 0.0453 (1.19)
bellsth 0.0303 (4.92) 0.0286 (4.32) 0.0821 (3.03) 0.0858 (3.46) 0.1148 (4.59)
centel −0.1309 (4.33) −0.1363 (4.71) 0.0616 (2.04) 0.0395 (1.22) 0.0823 (2.56)
contel 0.0033 (0.31) 0.0019 (0.17) −0.0017 (0.06) −0.0209 (0.63) −0.0162 (0.52)
gte −0.1242 (3.95) −0.1344 (4.17) 0.0083 (0.30) 0.0130 (0.45) 0.0150 (0.54)
nynex 0.0079 (0.77) 0.0103 (1.04) 0.0696 (1.49) 0.0402 (0.90) 0.0867 (1.93)
pactel −0.1443 (4.64) −0.1541 (4.85) −0.0493 (1.42) −0.0384 (1.09) −0.0594 (1.71)
swbell 0.0153 (1.90) 0.0140 (1.65) 0.0797 (2.97) 0.0964 (3.87) 0.0798 (3.22)
uswest 0.0257 (2.85) 0.0207 (1.92) 0.1299 (3.26) 0.0860 (2.67) 0.1440 (4.22)
nearend 0.0062 (1.52) 0.0206 (0.61)
wireline 0.0413 (2.78)
duopoly 0.3515 (4.60)
lnL −498.7856 −622.7401 −2090.9039 −4132.2132 −3088.6945
Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of regressors of Bernoulli PMLE. Absolute value, robust t-statistics are reported
between parentheses. Monopoly sample is used to obtain estimates of model I and II; Duopoly for III; and all observations for
IV and V.
to consistent and asymptotically normal estimates as long as the following conditional mean function is
correctly specified:19
E [share-foggyi |xi] = Λ (x′iβ) . (8)
Results show that there are very important differences between market regimes. Thus, for instance,
many of the foggy options offered by monopolists were the results of previous pricing decisions. The negative
effect of the phs/pli indicator in duopoly hints that competition trigger the introduction of foggy tactics
to compensate the reduction of profits relative to the monopoly phase. The positive effect of duopoly
and wireline in Model V, together with the positive and significant effect of these two variables in Table
19The choice of the logistic function Λ
(
x′iβ
)
= exp
(
x′iβ
)
/[1 + exp
(
x′iβ
)
] is arbitrary, and any other function (not
necessarily a distribution function) with a range in (0, 1) will also serve for the purpose of consistent estimation. Again, the
reported results are marginal effects evaluated for a market with average characteristics:
∂E [effplans |x]
∂xj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ x = βjΛ
(
x′β
)
[1− Λ (x′β)] .
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Table 6: Share of Foggy Options & Tariffs Phase-Out
I II III IV V
constant −0.1362 (0.84) −0.1609 (0.86) −0.7564 (1.22) −0.7453 (1.35) −0.8052 (1.46)
time −0.0027 (1.92) −0.0027 (1.83) −0.0017 (0.59) −0.0005 (0.19) −0.0025 (0.92)
mkt-age 0.0005 (0.98) 0.0008 (1.47) 0.0002 (0.27) −0.0002 (0.29) −0.0002 (0.25)
commuting −0.0008 (0.26) −0.0006 (0.20) 0.0087 (1.67) 0.0088 (1.87) 0.0109 (2.29)
coverage 0.0021 (0.21) −0.0010 (0.09) 0.0069 (0.20) −0.0167 (0.56) −0.0294 (1.00)
population −0.0032 (1.19) −0.0031 (1.08) −0.0079 (0.51) −0.0086 (0.60) −0.0086 (0.62)
pop-age −0.0036 (3.57) −0.0035 (3.41) 0.0121 (4.47) 0.0095 (3.66) 0.0087 (3.37)
education 0.0054 (0.45) 0.0112 (0.79) 0.0054 (0.12) 0.0148 (0.34) 0.0108 (0.25)
business 0.0001 (0.94) 0.0001 (1.00) −0.0001 (0.29) −0.0000 (0.06) −0.0001 (0.15)
growth −0.0058 (1.66) −0.0035 (0.92) −0.0078 (0.73) −0.0070 (0.71) −0.0042 (0.42)
income 0.0012 (0.93) 0.0004 (0.29) 0.0060 (1.38) 0.0043 (0.98) 0.0034 (0.77)
poverty 0.0135 (2.08) 0.0109 (1.65) 0.0463 (2.09) 0.0358 (1.92) 0.0302 (1.65)
varpoverty 0.0005 (1.94) 0.0004 (1.56) 0.0019 (2.00) 0.0013 (1.69) 0.0011 (1.48)
regulated −0.0088 (1.76) −0.0102 (1.89) 0.0162 (0.91) 0.0244 (1.47) 0.0136 (0.80)
profits 0.0000 (0.10) 0.0000 (0.13) −0.0032 (4.18) −0.0031 (4.36) −0.0037 (5.18)
ameritech −0.0133 (1.27) −0.0058 (0.57) −0.0547 (1.43) −0.0301 (0.85) −0.0538 (1.41)
bellatl 0.0303 (3.97) 0.0317 (4.14) −0.0103 (0.25) 0.0630 (1.66) 0.0500 (1.29)
bellsth 0.0283 (4.09) 0.0256 (3.25) 0.0856 (3.20) 0.1196 (4.73) 0.1195 (4.69)
centel −0.1292 (4.46) −0.1354 (4.72) 0.0611 (2.03) 0.0735 (2.31) 0.0827 (2.59)
contel 0.0030 (0.28) 0.0008 (0.07) −0.0040 (0.13) −0.0170 (0.54) −0.0167 (0.54)
gte −0.1178 (4.59) −0.1318 (4.91) 0.0034 (0.13) 0.0071 (0.25) 0.0116 (0.41)
nynex 0.0021 (0.18) 0.0068 (0.64) 0.0791 (1.63) 0.1004 (2.17) 0.0960 (2.01)
pactel −0.1345 (4.60) −0.1490 (4.96) −0.0431 (1.23) −0.0470 (1.33) −0.0554 (1.58)
swbell 0.0219 (2.82) 0.0180 (2.21) 0.0783 (2.98) 0.0839 (3.35) 0.0794 (3.22)
uswest 0.0199 (2.13) 0.0130 (1.06) 0.1386 (3.37) 0.1564 (4.27) 0.1544 (4.21)
nearend 0.0094 (2.23) 0.0223 (0.66)
wireline 0.0413 (2.78)
duopoly 0.2593 (1.92)
phs/pli 0.0891 (2.01) 0.0720 (1.58) −0.2149 (0.90) −0.3780 (3.76) −0.1505 (0.80)
lnL −628.2678 −746.8265 −2307.6886 −2521.8544 −2862.8126
Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of regressors of Bernoulli PMLE. Absolute value, robust t-statistics are reported
between parentheses. Monopoly sample is used to obtain estimates of model I and II; Duopoly for III; and all observations for
IV and V.
4 indicates that incumbents reacted drastically to the entry of competitors, offering both dominated and
non-dominated tariff options.
The negative sign of profits in duopoly appears to confirm this interpretation. Therefore, and
perhaps this is the most important result of the paper, foggy tactics appear to be employed when other
means of ensuring a “fair return,” i.e., , through finer screening of consumers, does not increase profits
much. Therefore, the use of foggy tactics will be more common in markets that have reached a certain
degree of maturity and competing firms steel business from each other. However, if the market expands and
profit expectations are high, the use of foggy tactics vanishes.
There are many other indications of the structural change in the fogginess of the pricing strategies
followed by these firms before and after entry of the second operator. Two firms centel and nynex embraced
foggy tactics as a way to compete against the other carrier, while three important firms who always employed
foggy tactics —bellsth, swbell, and uswest—, intensified its use in duopoly periods. Only one company,
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contel, remained “honest” in both market configurations while bellatl gave up profiting from deception
to face competitors.
Two more signs of this structural change are the positive and significant effect of nearend and
the loss of significance of regulated as we move into a competitive environment. nearend is intended
to capture any change of pricing behavior triggered by the imminent entry of a competitor. These change
of pricing behavior may be justified by dynamic considerations such as to avoid future competition by
increasing the captive customer base today with through the use of long term contracts. The positive effect
of nearend indicates that incumbents turned to foggy tactics to achieve that goal. Similarly, regulated
monopoly carriers were less likely to offer foggy options as they feared not obtaining the necessary regulatory
approval. As time goes on, and the consensus that a competitive markets do not need regulation arises, firms
possibly used this gained freedom to offer foggy options more frequently.
Again demographics have very little explanatory power, although the two significant ones may carry
some political considerations. It is more likely to encounter the use of foggy pricing in less affluent markets
while the average age of the population shows opposite signs depending on the market structure. Foggy
pricing was more common in “younger” markets during monopoly while deception in the duopolistic regime
is more common among “more senior” markets.
6 The Fogginess of Non-Dominated Tariff Options
Offering a tariff option that is totally dominated by one or a combination of the options offered by the same
cellular carrier does not exhaust the possibilities for firms trying to hide information from consumers and
thus benefit from their mistaken choices. In this section I focus on non-dominated options again, which are
defined as such even if they are the least expensive option for a single combination of peak and off-peak
airtime usage pattern. For instance, it is possible that one of the tariff options offered by a firm belongs to
the lower envelope of the tariff, say when a consumer talks on the phone exactly 183 peak minutes and 37
off-peak minutes. Evidently this tariff option is foggier than one that belongs to the lower envelope of the
tariff for a wide range of airtime usage.
Suppose that a firm offers three tariff options, each being the least expensive one for about one third
of the combinations of the peak and off-peak airtime usage. Thus, the tariff clearly targets low, medium, and
high valuation customers. Perhaps those with a consumption patterns close to the boundaries of these tariff
options may feel regret ex post because they did not subscribed to the right tariff option for their realized
usage.
We could compute a summary statistic to characterize the degree of fogginess of the menu of tariff
options offered by this firm. I will define this index of fogginess as 1 − HHI, where HHI stands for the
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Table 7: Fogginess of Non-Dominated Tariff Options
I II III IV V
constant 0.2395 (0.46) 0.2005 (0.38) −0.0327 (0.05) −0.1806 (0.32) −0.0512 (0.09)
time 0.0064 (2.04) 0.0056 (1.97) 0.0081 (2.61) 0.0085 (3.34) 0.0068 (2.51)
mkt-age −0.0021 (2.10) −0.0022 (2.14) −0.0017 (2.31) −0.0015 (2.34) −0.0016 (2.42)
commuting 0.0084 (1.61) 0.0086 (1.65) −0.0072 (1.48) −0.0085 (2.09) −0.0058 (1.34)
coverage −0.0974 (1.94) −0.0899 (1.83) 0.0562 (1.55) 0.0707 (2.36) 0.0506 (1.59)
population 0.0032 (0.51) 0.0018 (0.30) 0.0245 (1.36) 0.0146 (1.09) 0.0180 (1.32)
pop-age 0.0058 (2.80) 0.0060 (2.89) −0.0003 (0.09) −0.0005 (0.16) −0.0002 (0.05)
education −0.0551 (1.21) −0.0544 (1.18) −0.0293 (0.57) −0.0328 (0.71) −0.0364 (0.79)
business 0.0003 (1.86) 0.0003 (1.92) 0.0005 (1.09) 0.0006 (1.95) 0.0006 (1.72)
growth 0.0164 (1.98) 0.0151 (1.87) −0.0079 (0.71) 0.0009 (0.10) 0.0013 (0.14)
income 0.0005 (0.12) 0.0005 (0.13) 0.0102 (2.37) 0.0092 (2.48) 0.0094 (2.57)
poverty −0.0344 (1.56) −0.0327 (1.44) −0.0359 (2.07) −0.0307 (1.98) −0.0369 (2.31)
varpoverty −0.0011 (1.36) −0.0011 (1.27) −0.0015 (2.23) −0.0012 (2.01) −0.0014 (2.35)
regulated −0.0140 (0.97) −0.0101 (0.75) 0.0708 (3.75) 0.0733 (4.57) 0.0678 (4.08)
profits −0.0016 (2.25) −0.0016 (2.21) −0.0011 (1.18) 0.0002 (0.57) −0.0013 (1.72)
ameritech 0.0490 (1.39) 0.0366 (1.14) −0.0450 (1.02) 0.0093 (0.27) −0.0220 (0.56)
bellatl −0.0860 (1.75) −0.0932 (1.94) −0.0586 (1.24) −0.0737 (1.78) −0.0792 (1.89)
bellsth 0.0661 (1.78) 0.0609 (1.66) −0.0065 (0.22) −0.0146 (0.64) 0.0047 (0.18)
centel 0.0579 (0.91) 0.0491 (0.78) −0.1150 (3.00) −0.1211 (3.80) −0.0928 (2.66)
contel 0.0143 (0.25) 0.0009 (0.02) −0.0509 (1.47) −0.0489 (1.56) −0.0459 (1.46)
gte 0.0871 (2.29) 0.0866 (2.27) −0.0487 (1.72) −0.0295 (1.14) −0.0296 (1.16)
nynex −0.1090 (2.45) −0.1190 (2.66) −0.0583 (1.36) −0.0719 (2.09) −0.0474 (1.27)
pactel 0.0466 (1.14) 0.0526 (1.33) 0.0093 (0.34) 0.0217 (0.93) 0.0065 (0.27)
swbell 0.1343 (4.58) 0.1295 (4.35) −0.0696 (1.98) −0.0473 (1.49) −0.0529 (1.69)
uswest 0.0253 (0.61) 0.0222 (0.53) −0.0384 (0.82) −0.0487 (1.35) −0.0189 (0.47)
nearend −0.0125 (0.73) 0.0113 (0.25)
wireline −0.0024 (0.16)
duopoly 0.1695 (1.94)
lnL −56.3999 −49.4201 −249.8279 −317.5256 −287.8041
Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of regressors of Bernoulli PMLE. Absolute value, robust t-statistics are reported
between parentheses. Monopoly sample is used to obtain estimates of model I and II; Duopoly for III; and all observations for
IV and V.
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration defined over the share of airtime usage for which each firm
is the least expensive one. In the previous example of the firm with three “balanced” tariff options, this
fogginess index would be equal to 0.66.
Suppose now that another firm offers only two tariff options, each being the least expensive one
for about 50% of all airtime usage patterns. Now, fewer customers have consumption patterns close to the
boundary of these options because there is only one boundary instead of two. In this case the fogginess
index equals 0.5. Evidently, if a firm only offers one single option, it is not possible to feel regret ex post,
and consequently, the fogginess index equals 0.
To conclude with the description of this index —the endogenous variable to study in Tables 7 and
8—, consider again the case of the firm offering three tariff options. Now, one option is going to be the least
expensive for about 57% of airtime usage realizations; the second belongs to the lower envelope in 38% of
cases; and the third option is the least expensive for only 5% of airtime usage patterns. Intuitively, this
menu of options is less foggy than that of the first example. It is true than those who subscribe to the latter
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Table 8: Fogginess of Non-Dominated Tariff Options & Tariff Phase-Out
I II III IV V
constant 0.1651 (0.32) 0.1543 (0.32) 0.0011 (0.00) −0.0943 (0.16) −0.1702 (0.29)
time 0.0051 (1.67) 0.0049 (1.91) 0.0076 (2.44) 0.0082 (3.19) 0.0063 (2.30)
mkt-age −0.0021 (2.15) −0.0021 (2.18) −0.0016 (2.14) −0.0016 (2.40) −0.0015 (2.26)
commuting 0.0073 (1.47) 0.0073 (1.48) −0.0073 (1.47) −0.0077 (1.84) −0.0056 (1.29)
coverage −0.0751 (1.43) −0.0724 (1.57) 0.0522 (1.43) 0.0659 (2.17) 0.0457 (1.42)
population 0.0008 (0.12) 0.0004 (0.07) 0.0234 (1.32) 0.0159 (1.20) 0.0174 (1.29)
pop-age 0.0035 (1.64) 0.0034 (1.76) −0.0008 (0.21) −0.0002 (0.06) −0.0008 (0.26)
education −0.0608 (1.35) −0.0610 (1.35) −0.0317 (0.63) −0.0334 (0.72) −0.0385 (0.84)
business 0.0003 (1.95) 0.0003 (2.01) 0.0005 (1.12) 0.0006 (1.89) 0.0006 (1.71)
growth 0.0140 (1.76) 0.0137 (1.86) −0.0056 (0.50) 0.0002 (0.02) 0.0037 (0.38)
income 0.0018 (0.43) 0.0019 (0.48) 0.0096 (2.20) 0.0095 (2.57) 0.0088 (2.36)
poverty −0.0246 (1.13) −0.0237 (1.17) −0.0364 (2.10) −0.0325 (2.05) −0.0371 (2.33)
varpoverty −0.0008 (0.95) −0.0007 (0.95) −0.0015 (2.20) −0.0013 (2.09) −0.0014 (2.30)
regulated −0.0202 (1.32) −0.0200 (1.30) 0.0607 (2.95) 0.0749 (4.66) 0.0581 (3.17)
profits −0.0012 (1.67) −0.0012 (1.72) −0.0009 (0.93) −0.0004 (0.50) −0.0011 (1.37)
ameritech 0.0348 (0.85) 0.0320 (0.96) −0.0504 (1.12) 0.0016 (0.04) −0.0272 (0.69)
bellatl −0.0873 (1.78) −0.0884 (1.85) −0.0635 (1.34) −0.0735 (1.76) −0.0849 (2.01)
bellsth 0.0725 (2.00) 0.0721 (2.00) −0.0092 (0.31) −0.0067 (0.26) 0.0000 (0.00)
centel 0.0551 (0.87) 0.0535 (0.86) −0.1148 (2.98) −0.1118 (3.29) −0.0932 (2.68)
contel 0.0193 (0.35) 0.0177 (0.34) −0.0468 (1.34) −0.0489 (1.56) −0.0425 (1.35)
gte 0.1218 (2.66) 0.1241 (3.14) −0.0421 (1.48) −0.0313 (1.22) −0.0236 (0.92)
nynex −0.1266 (2.43) −0.1294 (2.71) −0.0730 (1.63) −0.0586 (1.50) −0.0626 (1.60)
pactel 0.0610 (1.49) 0.0628 (1.69) −0.0013 (0.05) 0.0196 (0.84) −0.0021 (0.08)
swbell 0.1450 (4.93) 0.1450 (4.92) −0.0680 (1.94) −0.0495 (1.56) −0.0518 (1.65)
uswest 0.0190 (0.45) 0.0180 (0.44) −0.0508 (1.03) −0.0340 (0.80) −0.0340 (0.79)
nearend −0.0025 (0.12) 0.0053 (0.11)
wireline −0.0029 (0.18)
duopoly 0.3185 (2.20)
phs/pli 0.1648 (1.04) 0.1763 (1.48) 0.2790 (1.22) −0.0833 (0.76) 0.2480 (1.26)
lnL −44.7108 −43.0886 −247.4934 −294.9987 −313.8073
Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of regressors of Bernoulli PMLE. Absolute value, robust t-statistics are reported
between parentheses. Monopoly sample is used to obtain estimates of model I and II; Duopoly for III; and all observations for
IV and V.
option are more likely to regret it ex post, but a wider customer base, subscribing to any of the other two
available options has become less “risky.” As the HHI increases with the asymmetry of the market shares
of airtime usage of each tariff option —Tirole (1989, §5.5)—, the proposed index of fogginess decreases with
it. The value of the index of fogginess for this example is 0.5282.
Estimating the results presented in Tables 7 and 8 makes use of the same Bernoulli pseudo maximum
likelihood estimator of Section 5, as again, the index of fogginess of tariff menus is takes values between 0
and 1.
Results indicate that phasing out of previously offered tariffs does not affect the degree of fogginess
of tariffs. The same can be said about many of the demographics, and in this case, also of individual firms.
Still, those estimates that are significant also support an important structural change when markets went
from monopoly to be served by two competing firms.
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Tariffs tend to be foggier as time goes by, although the longer a market has been served by at
least one firm induces to a more “balanced” (meaning symmetric) set of options. Monopolist realized high
profits by offering less tariff options, and most importantly, as regulation was progressively abandoned, firms
engaged in foggier offerings of non-dominated tariffs during the duopoly phase of these markets.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has addressed for the first time the determinants of the use of foggy tactics by firms both
under monopoly and duopoly market structure. In order to study how firms’ deceptive behavior respond to
potential profitability I construct three indicators from the available tariff information: the expected profits
of price discrimination from the shape and position of the tariffs, the share of dominated strategies in a very
wide range of potential airtime usage patterns, and the degree of fogginess from the share of usage time that
each tariff option is the least expensive among those offered by each firm.
The most important result is that expected profits have an ambiguous effect on the number of
non-dominated tariff options offered; it decreases the share of foggy strategies of firms —particularly in
competitive environments—; and it marginally reduces the fogginess of tariffs offered by monopolistic firms.
Thus, we should be confident that pursuing the maximization of profits as competition intensifies lead to a
gradual disappearing of dominated tariff options.
Should we conclude that the idea of foggy tactics is hollow? No, the evidence presented in this paper
corresponds to a particular industry in its infancy when tariffs were relatively simple. Fogginess involves the
fine letter of contracts and those issues never stated explicitly in incomplete contracts. There are many ways
of hiding information from consumers but not all of them are suitable to be properly codified to conduct a
proper econometric analysis. Furthermore, many of these matters are in essence dynamic and they evolve as
firms go through phases of cooperation and fierce competition. Let’s take again the negative sign of expected
profits on the share of foggy tariffs offered. The cellular industry has experimented a tremendous growth
since its introduction two decades ago. But what if we were in another more mature industry where entry
of another competitor only translates into a business stealing effect? Then an increase in competition will
bring expected profits down, and facing limited possibilities to increase the return to their investment, firms,
according to the results of Tables 5 and 6, will most likely turn their attention to deceptive strategies.
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